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ABSTRACT
As numerous scholars have noted, the law takes a strikingly incoherent
approach to adolescent reproduction. States overwhelmingly allow a
teenage girl to independently consent to pregnancy care and medical
treatment for her child, and even to give up her child for adoption, all
without notice to her parents, but require parental notice or consent for
abortion. This chapter argues that this oft-noted contradiction in the law
on teenage reproductive decision-making is in fact not as contradictory
as it first appears. A closer look at the law's apparently conflicting
approaches to teenage abortion and teenage childbirth exposes common
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ground that scholars have overlooked. The chapter compares the full
spectrum of minors' reproductive rights and unmasks deep similarities in
the law on adolescent reproduction - in particularan undercurrent of
desire to punish (female) teenage sexuality, whether pregnant girls
choose abortion or childbirth. It demonstrates that in practice, the law
undermines adolescents' reproductive rights, whichever path of pregnancy
resolution they choose. At the same time that the law thwarts adolescents' access to abortion care, it also fails to protect adolescents' rights
as parents. The analysis shows that these two superficially conflicting
sets of rules in fact work in tandem to enforce a traditional gender
script - that self-sacrificing mothers should give birth and give up their
infants to better circumstances, no matter the emotional costs to them-

selves. This chapter also suggests novel policy solutions to the difficulties
posed by adolescent reproduction by urging reforms that look to third
parties other than parents or the State to better support adolescent
decision-making relating to pregnancy and parenting.
Keywords: Teenage pregnancy; adolescents; abortion; reproductive
rights

INTRODUCTION
When does childhood end? The answer to this question determines the legal
rights of youth in all arenas of life (Scott, 2000). Yet, as many scholars
have noted, the law lacks a coherent approach to defining the end of childhood, the beginning of adulthood, or a space in between (Cunningham,
2006). Those categorized as children for most purposes can be criminally
liable as adults. Those categorized as adults for most purposes cannot
legally purchase alcohol. Those who many view as falling in between the
categories of child or adult - adolescents - are invisible under the law

(Mutcherson, 2006; Rebouch6, 2011).
The law's incoherent approach to adolescent sexuality and reproduction
is especially striking. For example, in states with parental notice or consent
mandates, which represent the vast majority of states, teenage girls facing
an unplanned pregnancy must obtain permission from a parent or, alternatively, from a judge to receive abortion care. In contrast, states typically
exempt other similarly sensitive medical care from parental involvement,
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especially medical care related to sexual activity. All states allow minors to
obtain treatment for sexually transmitted infections without notifying their
parents, and many states allow minors to receive prescription contraceptives without involving a parent (Cunningham, 2006). States also overwhelmingly allow a teenage girl to independently consent to pregnancy care

and medical treatment for her child, and even to give up her child for adoption, all without notice to her parents (Scott, 2000). Yet, these same states
mandate parental notice or consent for abortion (Durcan & Appell, 2001;
Wadlington, 1994). If teenagers are too immature to make the decision to
obtain an abortion without parental or judicial supervision, how can states
conclude that those same teenagers are mature enough to decide to continue a pregnancy and raise a child, or to relinquish the child for adoption,
all without the guidance of an adult?
This chapter argues that this oft-noted contradiction in the law on adolescent reproduction is in fact not as contradictory as it first appears. A
closer look at the law's apparently conflicting approaches to teenage repro-

ductive decision-making reveals common ground that scholars have overlooked. This chapter uses a wider lens to assess minors' reproductive rights
and unmask deep similarities in the law on adolescent reproduction, in particular by comparing the law on minors' rights to obtain abortion care with
minors' parental rights. Through this wider lens, this chapter reveals that in
reality, the result of these superficially contradictory legal rules has been
not so much that the two areas of law conflict, but instead that the law
undermines adolescents' rights whichever path of pregnancy resolution
they choose. At the same time that the law thwarts teenage girls' access to
abortion care, it also fails to protect their rights as parents.
A more expansive inquiry into adolescents' reproductive rights demon-

strates that the conflicting doctrines in fact work in tandem to enforce a
traditional gender script, namely self-sacrificing mothers should give birth
and give up their children to better circumstances than teenage parenting
presumably provides, regardless of the emotional pain these young mothers
might suffer as a result of relinquishment. The notion that the law should

mete out punishment onto sexually irresponsible women, such as by denying access to abortion or removing their children, has a long history

(Appleton, 2011; Borgmann, 2014; Sanger, 1996). The impact of the law's
punishment falls most harshly on adolescents from poor and struggling
families, as these youth have the fewest resources to obtain either judicial
bypass for an abortion or support for making parenting decisions.
This chapter also suggests that we could better support adolescents' decisions about pregnancy and parenting by turning to third party adults other

-
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than parents or state agents - such as judges and child welfare officials
who wield heavy-handed authority over minors. Abortion law, child
welfare law, and adoption law all purport to serve two primary goals: to
ensure sound decision-making for pregnant or parenting adolescents and
to protect the well-being of children. Yet, in practice, the law too often fails
to achieve these goals. Parents may be unsupportive or unavailable to
adolescents, and state agents may be motivated by biases and concerns that
conflict with pregnant or parenting minors' own interests. Although some
adolescents can make sound reproductive decisions without being required
to consult with an adult, political resistance to increased adolescent
autonomy - particularly around sexuality and reproduction - remains
formidable. Furthermore, scientific research on adolescence suggests that
some adolescents would benefit from adult guidance when faced with
difficult, consequential decisions. Therefore, law makers should consider
more effective policy solutions beyond the parent/state binary to achieve

the stated aims of securing sound reproductive decision-making and
protecting the well-being of both pregnant adolescents and their infants.
Depending on the context, third parties who might serve as beneficial
resources for pregnant or parenting minors include extended family
members, neighbors, and community members; health care professionals;
and lawyers acting on behalf of the minor.
The chapter considers potential policy reforms incorporating third
parties and urges further conversation in this direction.

PARENTS, CHILDREN, AND THE STATE: A
CONSTITUTIONAL BALANCING ACT
The conventional framing of the family within U.S. law "embrace[s] the
image of a triangle to describe the allocation of legal authority over childrearing" with parents, children, and the State standing at each point of the
triangle (Rosenbury, 2007). Balancing the interests of child, parent, and
State has been an ongoing struggle at the federal and state levels across various family law issues. At times, the law portrays parents' and children's
liberty interests as aligned against encroachment by the State. At other
times, the law treats parents' and children's rights as in conflict, and the
State acts as arbiter between the two. This chapter grounds the discussion
that follows by providing the legal context for rules governing parents,

minors, and minor parents.
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Privacy and Parents'Rights

Although the Supreme Court has recognized that children possess constitutional rights, minors' rights have long been curtailed based on the state's
interest in protecting vulnerable and immature minors and the state's deference to parents' constitutional right to control their children's upbringing.

The Court long ago established that parents possess a fundamental right to
raise their children as they see fit. In 1923, in Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court

struck down a state law forbidding education in a language other than
English on the ground that due process protects parents' rights to "estab-

lish a home and bring up children" and "to control the education of their
own" (Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-401 (1923). Two years later,
in Pierce v. Society of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, the
Court found that an Oregon law prohibiting parochial school education
"unreasonably interfere[d] with the liberty of parents and guardians to

direct the upbringing and education of children under their control"
(Pierce, 268 U.S. 510, 534, 535 (1925)). Over the years, the Court has
repeatedly upheld parents' fundamental right of authority over their children, stating that "it is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture
of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom
include preparation for obligations that the state can neither supply nor
hinder" (Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979); Prince v. Massachusetts,

321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944a); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972)).
Most recently, in Troxel v. Granville, the Court reaffirmed the extensive
line of precedent granting parents the fundamental right to raise their children without interference from the government, although in a notably circumscribed manner (Troxel, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000)). In Troxel, Justice

O'Connor's controlling plurality opinion held that courts must give "special weight" to a fit parent's determination of her child's best interests, but
otherwise established no broad rule limiting third party, non-parent visita-

tion laws (Buss, 2002; Gregory, 2006; Troxel, 530 U.S. 57, 58 (2000)).
Although Troxel granted a sliver of deference to parental rights, the plurality also acknowledged the "changing realities of the American family" and
confirmed the important role that third parties play in today's pluralistic
families: "The demographic changes of the past century make it difficult to
speak of an average American family ... [P]ersons outside the nuclear family are called upon with increasing frequency to assist in the everyday tasks

of child rearing" (Troxel, 530 U.S. 57, 63-64 (2000)). Minority communities in particular rely heavily on parental surrogates in childrearing, as a
number of scholars have discussed (Kessler, 2007; Maldonado, 2003).
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Numerous cases post-Troxel permit nonparents to exercise "custodial fragments" - most importantly visitation rights - which represent a significant
intrusion upon parental control over their child's upbringing (Buss, 2002,

pp. 635, 636; Richman, 2009, pp. 115, 116).
Troxel noted that a parent's right to make decisions concerning the care
of his or her children has never been unlimited. The Court has consistently
balanced parents' rights against the state's independent interest in protecting the welfare of its youth. The state's parens patriaepower gives it leeway
to limit parental authority if the State has sufficient justification to conclude that a parental decision would be harmful to the child's health and
development (Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640 (1968); Pierce v.
Soc'y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510,
534, 535 (1925)). For example, in Prince v. Massachusetts, the Court upheld
the application of child labor laws to a nine-year-old girl who was soliciting
for the Jehovah's Witness religion at her parents' direction (Prince v.

Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 169, 170 (1944b)). The Court emphasized that
the state possesses the authority to "guard the general interest in youth's
well being" and, therefore, can "restrict the parent's control by requiring
school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child's labor, and in many

other ways" (Prince, 321 U.S. 158, 166).
The state's power to circumscribe parents' constitutional right to custody and control over their child's upbringing has particularly been rein-

forced in cases where a parent's decision-making may place the child's
health in jeopardy. Numerous cases have upheld the state's power to limit
a parent's decision-making authority where such authority presents a significant risk of harm to a child's health (Hill, 2012; Hodgson v. Minnesota,

497 U.S. 417, 471 (1990); Mutcherson, 2005). The important governmental
interest in protecting children's health plays a large role in the debates on
adolescents' abilities to access sensitive medical treatment, particularly

related to sexuality and reproduction.

Privacy and Adolescents' Rights
In the context of sexual and reproductive decision-making, the Court has
struggled to find a way to balance the respective interests of child, parent,
and state. Following the Court's decisions upholding adults' right to access
contraceptives, in Carey v. Population Services International, the Court
declared unconstitutional laws restricting minors' access to contraception
(Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 678 (1977). Carey

&

Teenage Pregnancy, Parenting,and Abortion

87

acknowledged that the question of the state's power to regulate constitutionally protected conduct when engaged in by minors "is a vexing one,
perhaps not susceptible of precise answer," but nevertheless, the Court
struck down a state law prohibiting distribution of contraception to those
under 16 (Carey, 431 U.S. at 692). Carey found that the State's desire to

deter minors' sexual activity "by increasing the hazards attendant on it"
was insufficient justification to infringe upon a minor's constitutional rights
(Carey, 431 U.S. at 694; Hill, 2015).
With respect to abortion, since the Supreme Court's decision in Bellotti v.
Baird (Bellotti II) in 1979, laws requiring parental involvement in minors'
abortion decisions have been constitutional, provided that the laws offer judi-

cial bypass as an alternative to parental involvement (Bellotti II, 443 U.S. 622
(1979); Dennis et al., 2009). Bellotti II found that minors' right to access
abortion could be restricted for three reasons: "[T]he peculiar vulnerability of

children; their inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature
manner; and the importance of the parental role in child rearing." (Bellotti II,
443 U.S. at 634). The Bellotti II Court held that parental consent laws with
an expeditious and confidential judicial bypass alternative appropriately
balance the minor's constitutional right to access abortion with both the

parental right to control their child's upbringing and the state's interest in
protecting vulnerable and immature minors (Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 634;
Scarnecchia & Field, 1995). Importantly, Bellotti II made clear that parents

could not exercise a veto over a minor's decision to obtain an abortion;
rather, parental or judicial involvement served to ensure better decisionmaking because "immature minors often lack the ability to make fully

informed choices" (Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 640, 649, 643-650).
In Planned Parenthoodv. Casey, which reassessed and ultimately upheld
aspects of the core right to access abortion established in Roe v. Wade, the

Court reaffirmed the constitutionality of parental consent laws so long as
those laws provided for judicial bypass (Casey, 505 U.S. at 899; Helling
Nam, 2010). The Court's refusal to allow a parental veto and its requirement
of an alternative to parental consent are pivotal to understanding the Court's
balancing of the interests at stake in parental involvement laws. Bellotti Ii's

reasoning makes clear that the core justification for mandated parental
involvement and judicial bypass is to ensure better decision-making for the
minor laws. Although the Court recognized parents' rights to control their
children's upbringing and to have a voice in abortion decisions, in balancing
the various interests at stake, the Court refused to place the parents' rights
above the minor's reproductive rights - otherwise, allowing judicial bypass
or other alternatives would not make sense (Guggenheim, 2005).
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The Supreme Court's 2016 decision in Whole Woman's Health v.
Hellerstedt, while not addressing minors' abortion rights, could open a path
toward reform of parental involvement laws by providing an opportunity to
reassess whether parental involvement laws and the judicial bypass system
actually serve their purported goals (Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt,
136 S.Ct. 2292 (2016)). Whole Woman's Health clarified the constitutional
test for abortion rights established almost 25 years ago in Casey. Casey prohibited any abortion restrictions that act as an "undue burden" on a woman's
right to access abortion care, and defined an undue burden as a law that has
the "purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman seeking an abortion" (Casey, 505 U.S. at 869).
Whole Woman's Health clarified that the undue burden test requires the
government to prove that an abortion restriction actually serves its purported goals, and requires courts to balance a law's burdens on abortion
access against its benefits (Whole Woman's Health, 136 S.Ct. at 2309, 2317,
2318). The opinion's careful analysis also demonstrated that courts must
canvas the empirical evidence on both the benefits and burdens of an abortion regulation. Rather than deferring to a state legislature's unsupported
assertion that an abortion restriction protects women's health, Whole

Woman's Health stressed that the "Court retains an independent constitutional duty to review factual findings where constitutional rights are at

stake" (Whole Woman's Health, 136 S.Ct. at 2310).
Whole Woman's Health's emphasis on the need for the government to
present empirical evidence supporting an abortion restriction's asserted
benefits should prompt a rethinking of laws mandating parental or judicial involvement. As discussed below, empirical evidence suggests that
these laws fail to achieve their purported goal of enhancing adolescent
abortion decision making, while imposing heavy burdens especially on
the most vulnerable minors. Particularly when less restrictive alternatives
are available, such as involving third party adults like professional counselors, the judicial bypass system for minors seeking abortion care should
be reconsidered.
The rules for judicial bypass hearings in abortion cases are well established. Judges in bypass hearings may authorize a minor's abortion care
after determining (1) that the minor is sufficiently mature to choose an
abortion without involving a parent or, in the alternative, (2) that the abortion is in her best interests (Scarnecchia & Field, 1995). Studies analyzing
the actual operation of parental involvement laws demonstrate the failure
of judicial bypass to serve as a fair compromise that improves adolescent
decision-making. In fact, decades of studies on the efficacy of parental
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involvement legislation demonstrate that these laws harm more than help
adolescent girls (Manian, 2012).
Public health research on the impact of parental involvement legislation
on teenagers indicates that these laws do not improve parent-child communication, protect teenagers' health, or reduce the number of abortions.

Rather, the evidence indicates that mandated parental involvement with
abortion is unnecessary in many cases and harmful in others (Manian,

2012; Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Farmer, 762 A.2d 620, 637, 638
(N.J. 2000)). Studies also confirm what should be no surprise: that the judicial bypass hearings cause significant psychological distress (Ehrlich, 2003).
Teenage girls who do not discuss their pregnancies with their parents often

have weighty fears about forced disclosure, including fears of being kicked
out of their family homes or fears of abuse (Webster et al., 2010). These
teenagers' only other option is equally distressing because, to prove their
maturity to a judge, they must discuss the most intimate details of their
lives to a complete stranger in a courtroom environment that would intimidate most adults (Sanger, 2004).
Scholars who have extensively analyzed the bypass process conclude

that the judicial hearings operate primarily as a means to shame teenage
girls for their transgression of gendered sexual purity norms (Raskin, 2002;
Sanger, 2004). Judges interrogate girls about the most intimate aspects of
their lives, in some cases asking inappropriate and irrelevant questions,

such as demanding to know where and how often the individual had sex
(Silverstein, 2007). Professor Carol Sanger argues that the harms that flow
from judicial bypass include not only the risk of medical harm due to delay,
but also the dignitary harms that arise from the humiliation inflicted by the
bypass hearing itself (Sanger, 2009). Parental involvement laws also most
heavily punish the most vulnerable and marginalized minors - those who
lack supportive parents, parental surrogates, or the resources to readily
access the court system. Professor Sanger succinctly summarizes the opin-

ion of many critics of parental involvement mandates:
[P]arental involvement statutes, while often couched in the language of family togetherness and child protection, are less concerned with developing sound or nuanced family
policies in the area of adolescent reproduction than with securing a set of political goals
aimed at thwarting access to abortion, restoring parental authority, and punishing girls
for having sex. (Sanger, 2004, p. 306)

In short, the law on adolescent abortion expresses a skeptical view of adolescent reproductive decision-making and an intent to punish female teenage sexual expression.
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Despite evidence that mandated parental involvement and judicial
bypass fail to improve minors' abortion decision-making, the vast majority
of states impose these requirements. The popularity of legislation mandating parental involvement with abortion is quite striking, especially in con-

trast to the autonomy that almost all states grant to minors who choose to
carry a pregnancy to term. One obvious explanation for this core contradiction - the law's privileging minors who choose to carry a pregnancy to
term with decisional autonomy and punishing minors who choose abortion
by subjecting their decisions to parental or judicial authority - is that these
laws simply reflect an anti-abortion agenda (Scott, 2000). I agree with
critics that a large part of the motivation for mandating parental involvement with abortion arises from anti-abortion advocacy (Ehrlich, 2003).
Certainly, there are legislators and advocates of parental involvement laws
who are motivated by their anti-abortion stance, seeking to throw any
obstacles in the way of girls' and women's access to abortion (Major et al.,

2008; Munk-Olsen et al., 2011; Sanger, 2004, 2009).
Nevertheless, a more expansive inquiry into the law on minors' reproductive decision-making reveals a more broadly troubling approach to adolescent pregnancy and parenting. If we look at the whole picture of adolescents'
reproductive rights, comparing abortion law and the law on minor parents'
parental rights, we will see that the law undermines adolescents' rights which-

ever path of pregnancy resolution they choose. At the same time that the law
thwarts adolescents' access to abortion care, it also fails to protect adolescents' rights as parents. Although, in theory, minor parents possess the same
rights as adults to bear and rear children, in reality, minor parents' parental
rights are tenuous. Minor parents from poor communities and, in particular,
racial minorities, remain doubly vulnerable to disruption of their parental
rights. The next Part more closely examines the reality of minor parents' ability to rear their children and unmasks similarities in the law's approach to
adolescent abortion and adolescent parenthood.

MINORS, PARENTS, AND MINORS AS PARENTS
This part looks to family law doctrines and practices to make sense of the
law's unusual grant of adult-like rights to minor parents on the face of the
law and to expose the reality that the law often tramples upon minor parents' parental rights in practice. The law on adolescent reproduction
appears inconsistent in its surface treatment of abortion versus childbirth,
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but a deeper analysis exposes commonalities scholars have overlooked.
Although the law grants parental rights to minor parents in theory, a
closer examination of areas of family law that deal directly with minors as
parents - namely, child welfare law and adoption law - reveals a similarly skeptical view of adolescent reproductive decision-making and a
desire to punish female teenage sexual transgression of purity norms,
whether pregnant teenage girls choose abortion or childbirth.
This part focuses primarily on adolescent mothers given the greater likelihood of their involvement in parenting decisions. As this part will show,

adolescent parents remain at an especially high risk of oversight by the
child welfare system and, therefore, of having the state remove their
children from their custody (How the Child Welfare System Works, 2013;
Issue Brief: Rebuild the Nation's Child Welfare System, 2009). Even
though the child welfare system also subjects adult parents from marginalized populations to high levels of scrutiny and disrespect of their parental
rights, minor parents from marginalized families remain doubly vulnerable
to state action stripping their parental rights (Manian, 2012). Minor
mothers encounter multiple layers of bias based on their age, as well as
their race, poverty, and gender (Glesner Fines, 2011). Girls in foster care
who confront a higher risk of teenage pregnancy remain particularly vul-

nerable to the involuntary removal of their infants or pressure to surrender
for adoption, due in part to state officials' skepticism of teenagers' abilities
to parent. The tenuousness of minors' legal rights to access abortion or
to parent their children is especially apparent for the most marginalized
minors, as laws restricting access to abortion and child welfare practices
disproportionately affect the poor and racial minorities.
While poor and racial minority minor parents particularly suffer under
child welfare practices, even teenage parents from less marginalized groups
face risks to their parental rights under past and present adoption law practices (Appleton, 2011). With regard to adoption law, opponents of abortion
present adoption as a better alternative to abortion, but research on adoption practices presents a disturbing picture of unwarranted and less than

voluntary removals of minor parents' infants by both private actors and
state agents (Siegel, 2008).
To sum up the analysis below, the examination of minor parents in the

child welfare and adoption systems reveals two key insights. First, the law
takes a highly skeptical view of adolescent girls' reproductive decisionmaking, whether they seek to terminate their pregnancies or to parent their
children. Second, legal rules that claim to protect adolescents' interests,
such as judicial bypass in the abortion context and the right to relinquish

&
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in the adoption context, instead provide a means to punish female teenage
sexuality and enforce traditional gender norms. Rather than standing in
conflict, the law on minor parents operates in conjunction with abortion
law to enforce a traditional gender script - that self-sacrificing mothers
should give birth and give up their infants to better circumstances than
teenage parents can presumably provide (Borgmann, 2014).

Minor Parents and the Child Welfare System
Experts generally agree that the child welfare system is broken (Stotland
Godsoe, 2006; Huntington, 2006). The vast majority of child welfare cases
involve poverty-related neglect rather than severe abuse (Stotland
Godsoe, 2006). Thousands of children are removed from their parents' custody each year, even though few emerge better off than if they had
remained in their homes (Stotland & Godsoe, 2006). Teenage parents present particularly difficult challenges for the system.
The United States has the highest adolescent pregnancy rate and birth rate
of any industrialized nation (Fast Facts: Teen Birth Rates, 2014; Glesner
Fines, 2011). Each year, almost 750,000 girls between the ages of 15 and 19
become pregnant. Roughly 60 percent of these girls give birth (Glesner Fines,
2011; Martin et al., 2010). The lives of teenage mothers rarely resemble the

nearly idyllic reality of teen motherhood portrayed in media depictions.
Although it is a common intuition that teenage parenthood is likely to
lead to poverty, recent research shows that teenage parenthood may be
caused by poverty (Glesner Fines, 2011; Merritt, 1996; Seymore, 2013). Poor
young women are more likely to become pregnant than their economically
better off peers (Merritt, 1996). Teenage motherhood is a symptom of pov-

erty that often cycles to the next generation. Generally speaking, teenage
mothers are more likely to need public assistance compared to girls of similar
socio-economic status who postpone childbirth (Cahn & Carbone, 2010;
Glesner Fines, 2011; Merritt, 1996). Adolescent mothers are also significantly
less likely than their non-parenting peers to complete high school or obtain a
GED by the age of 22 (Fact Sheet: American Teens' Sexual and

Reproductive Health, 2014; Glesner Fines, 2011; Klepinger et al., 1995;
Merritt, 1996; Perper et al., 2010). Furthermore, as with adult parents, poverty places minor parents at a greater risk of oversight from the child welfare
system (Glesner Fines, 2011; Turcios et al., 2009). Bias in the child welfare
system has been the subject of extensive study and criticism, and ample

-&
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evidence suggests that poverty and race place adult parents at a higher risk of
state intervention (Stotland & Godsoe, 2006; Roberts, 2001).
However, teenage parents face additional hurdles to preserving their
parental rights based on their minority. Multiple vectors of discrimination,
including gender, race, and class, intersect with age-based concerns, leaving

minor parents doubly vulnerable to disruption of their parental rights. Minor
parents are generally more likely to come into contact with the child welfare
system than adult parents. For mothers age 15 or younger, the risk of the
state removing their child from their care due to neglect or abuse are nearly
double that of mothers between 20 and 21 years old (Glesner Fines, 2011;
Goerge et al., 2008). Adolescents who are themselves wards of the state are
more likely to become teen parents than their peers, presenting particularly
thorny problems for the child welfare system (Glesner Fines, 2011;
Stotland & Godsoe, 2006). This population of parenting wards "is nearly
invisible in the academic literature of both law and the social sciences, in
state policies, in practice guides for children's attorneys and guardians ad
litem, and in the demographic data on children in foster care" (Sheppard
Woltman, 2005; Stotland & Godsoe, 2006, p. 61). An adolescent parent

who herself was a victim of abuse and neglect remains accountable to the
same extent as an adult to charges of child abuse or neglect of her child.
Yet, the child welfare system does little to ensure that the cycle of abuse
does not repeat itself (Stotland & Godsoe, 2006). Research shows that

adolescents in foster care are more likely to become teenage parents, and
children born to teen mothers are more likely to end up in foster care (Katz,
2006; Ng & Kelleen Kaye, 2013). Sarah Katz, a lawyer for parents in depen-

dency cases, describes this double-edged system of "protection":
I am startled by how quickly the system turns the tables on young parents, holding
them accountable for their lack of independent living skills or poor judgment as parents
the very proficiencies that the dependency and delinquency systems are supposed to
provide in loco parentis. (Katz, 2006, p. 535)

Minor parents in the foster care system are at a particularly high risk of
having both inadequate access to abortion care, especially in states with
parental involvement mandates, and of losing custody of their infants
(Rebouche, 2011; Walis, 2014). Although there are legal and economic
incentives for the child welfare system to allow foster children to maintain
custody of their infants, child welfare scholars have surfaced ample evidence that, in practice, state officials often ignore minors' parental rights
(Stotland & Godsoe, 2006). Historically, state agents often viewed parenting wards as inherently inadequate parents, and accordingly, they separated
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infants from their teenage mothers. A combination of prejudices based on
the age, class, and race of parenting wards worked against teenage mothers'
rights to maintain custody of their infants (Bonagura, 2008). Supposedly
"voluntary" surrenders of infants to foster care or adoption frequently
resulted from coercive pressures, including lack of financial resources,
denial of housing unless the minor parent surrendered her legal rights to
her infant, and lack of understanding of legal rights (In re C., 607 N.Y.S.2d
1014-1016 (Fam. Ct., 1994); In re Tricia Lashlawanda M., 451 N.Y.S.2d
553, 554 (Fam. Ct. 1982)). One commentator observes:
"[V]oluntary" separation of parenting wards [minor parents in foster care] from their
children is frequently the result of coercive measures; specifically young mothers have
been pushed into giving up their children because of a lack of available services and

funding. Foster care staff may threaten removal of their children, coercing these
mothers into following strict rules and into not complaining about inadequate care.
(Bonagura, 2008, pp. 181, 182)

Stories abound of child welfare workers unjustifiably removing children
from teenage mothers under the guise of child protection. For example, due
to a shortage of placement availability for mother/child pairs in the foster
care system, minor parents may suffer unwanted, and sometimes illegal,
separations from their children (Stotland & Godsoe, 2006). In their study of
parenting youth in foster care, Eve Stotland and Cynthia Godsoe find:
Most disturbingly, advocates across the country report that states and counties frequently violate parenting ward's due process rights by coercing teens into "voluntarily"
placing their child in government custody, separating wards from their children absent
proper judicial findings, and threatening to remove infants from wards' care based on
infractions which do not pose an imminent risk of harm to the baby. (Stotland
Godsoe, 2006, p. 61)

One study describes the rationale for removal as based on fear of teenage
girls' abilities to parent:
The majority of caseworkers in the foster care system were terrified of being blamed for
something happening to babies of teen mothers, and thus they tended to take the babies
and put them in separate homes. They didn't worry that this was against the law, which
permitted removal only in cases of imminent risk. For them imminent risk was synony-

mous with teenage mothers. (Krebs & Pitcoff, 2006, p. 82)

Other research on parenting wards describes similar stories of the child
welfare system's failure to provide needed resources to minors who wish to
parent their children - a lack of support that often results in the deprivation of parental rights (Roberts, 2001; Sheppard & Woltman, 2005).
Overall, evidence indicates that minor parents in foster care "face an up-hill
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struggle to maintain custody of their children even where no one has
accused them of being unfit to parent" (Stotland & Godsoe, 2006, p. 25).

In addition, in child welfare law generally, and especially with adolescent
parenting wards, the "overlay of racial bias and economic inequality is
impossible to ignore" (Stotland & Godsoe, 2006, p. 60). When youth in fos-

ter care, who are disproportionately poor and racial minorities, "lose their
children to the system, the social inequalities that contributed to the wards'
initial placement are revisited upon a second generation" (Stotland
Godsoe, 2006, p. 60). Thus, the child welfare system's "failure to support
parenting wards creates foster care 'legacy' families, every generation of

which is raised in the state-controlled environment of foster care" (Stotland
Godsoe, 2006, p. 61).
Unwarranted removal of their children remains an ongoing hazard,
especially for minor parents in the foster care system, but teenage parents

from less marginalized populations still confront similar risks (Fershee,
2012). The disabilities of minority, such as the inability to form a contract,
place minor parents at a greater risk of losing their children in a dependency proceeding (Fershee, 2012; Katz, 2006). A number of commentators
have noted that teenage parents are likely to have their parenting more

closely scrutinized and are more likely to interact with individuals who are
mandated reporters of abuse and neglect who may assume that children of
minor parents are at risk simply by virtue of the parents' minority
(Bonagura, 2008; Glesner Fines, 2011; Stotland & Godsoe, 2006). Once

subject to review by child welfare workers, skepticism toward girls' reproductive and parenting decision-making drives a tendency to disrupt their
parental rights (Katz, 2006).
One other common strain of thought underlies these practices and
threads through both child welfare and adoption law. The common conception that appears to animate resistance to supporting teenagers' parental
rights is that termination of a minor parent's parental rights and placement
of the infant for adoption will serve the best interests of both children: the

minor parent and her infant. In theory, the minor parent would be free to
pursue educational and career opportunities and her child could be raised

in a more stable home by experienced adults desiring to parent (Buss, 2002;
Carothers et al., 2006). However, evidence does not support the contention
that, generally speaking, termination of parental rights results in positive
consequences for both the adolescent parent and her child (Stotland
Godsoe, 2006). Even if it is generally true that children of teenage parents
do not fare as well as those of adult parents, it does not follow that those
children will necessarily fare better or even find alternative placements,
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especially if parents or state officials coerce removal of the minor parent's
infant (Buss, 2002; Glesner Fines, 2011; Stotland & Godsoe, 2006).
Involuntary removal of a child from his or her parents may have long-term
negative consequences for both the teenage parent and her infant. As
Barbara Glesner-Fines explains:
For teen parents, that loss is not less than when adults have their parental rights terminated. A relinquishment is not cost free to any parent .... One can presume that the loss
is equal if not more profound when the parent has her rights terminated. For teen parents, the loss and grief of relinquishing or losing a child is aggravated by the circumstances of fewer resources to make these decisions and less emotional maturity to cope

with the emotional fallout. (Glesner Fines, 2011, pp. 317, 318)

For a minor parent in foster care who typically has little family other than
her own children, "[t]he possibility that her child will relive her fate may be
particularly devastating" (Stotland & Godsoe, 2006, p. 23). Furthermore,
there is no guarantee that a minor parent pressured into giving up her child

will have educational or career opportunities that will improve her economic
circumstances, or that her child will find an adoptive placement rather than
languish in foster care (Buss, 2002; Perez, 1998). To the contrary, poor and
racial minority minor parents and their infants have much more limited
opportunities for stable adoptive placements (Roberts, 2001, 2003, 2007).
Although, in theory, minor parents possess the same rights as adult

parents to rear their children, child welfare practices indicate that, in reality,
the law allows for a deep skepticism toward the rights of minor parents to
parent their children (Bonagura, 2008). Particularly for minor parents in
foster care, social workers and judges "too often take a policing approach
toward [parenting wards] that is adversarial and punitive, rather than
supportive, educational, and preventative" (Bonagura, 2008, p. 178). Yet,
"Just as poverty should not be confused with neglect, so too a parent's youth
should not be taken as synonymous with an imminent risk of harm to their
child" (Glesner Fines, 2011, p. 326). Reflecting the problem of under-funding
and racial and class bias endemic to the child welfare system, the law often
responds by taking adolescent mothers' children away from their care, rather
than by providing needed resources to support their parenting.

Minor Parents and Adoption Law
The child welfare system's disregard of minors' parental rights has parallels
in adoption law. Adoption occurs by two methods: (1) the state can
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terminate parental rights based on severe abuse or neglect and place the

child for adoption or (2) parents can voluntarily relinquish their child for
adoption (Harding, 2001). Strikingly, there are generally no special protections for minor parents in either circumstance; most state laws treat adult
parents and minor parents exactly the same in rules for involuntary termi-

nation and voluntary relinquishment (Seymore, 2013). Abortion opponents
often present adoption as the better alternative to abortion, but research
on the adoption of minor parents' infants presents a troubling picture of

unwarranted terminations of parental rights, less-than-voluntary relinquishments, and difficulty finding placements for racial minority children.

The first method of adoption - the involuntary termination of parental
rights - arises in the context of a child welfare dependency proceeding,
such as a child abuse or neglect case (Demarce, 1996). As discussed above,

in many cases, the child welfare system's failure to adequately support
minor parents leads to a higher incidence of adolescent parents being
charged with abuse or neglect and a higher risk of losing their infant, either
through an involuntary termination proceeding or through pressure to
"voluntarily" relinquish their child.
The second method of adoptive placement - voluntary relinquishment

or "surrender" of a child - also raises special concerns in the context of
adolescent parenting. In addition to those minors whose parental rights are
at risk for termination by the child welfare system, "5% of teen birth
mothers affirmatively relinquish their children for adoption" (Glesner
Fines, 2011, p. 313). The overall picture of voluntary relinquishment by
minor parents remains quite murky because "[t]hese processes of relinquishment are less visible, with less certain rights to representation, than
involuntary termination processes" (Glesner Fines, 2011, p. 313). Moreover,
"The degree to which these mothers' decisions are voluntary is difficult to

assess" (Glesner Fines, 2011, p. 313). As described above, evidence from the
child welfare context suggests that parenting wards may be coerced into
"voluntarily" surrendering their children, sometimes due to a lack of services

(Stotland & Godsoe, 2006). While child welfare law disproportionately
impacts poor minority parents, adoption law practices, both historically and
with modern day revocation rules, suggest that even less marginalized groups

of adolescent mothers remain subject to disdain for their parental rights.
Revocation case law, discussed further below, indicates that some teenage
mothers "voluntarily" relinquish their infants as a result of pressure from
their own family, adoptive families and agencies, or state officials, and these

mothers face extreme difficulties getting their infants back when they wish to
set aside their consent to the adoption.
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For the most part, state law governs adoption, and therefore, technical

requirements vary. In a traditional or "closed" adoption, adoption terminates all legal and social contact between a child and his or her biological
family. The move to "open" adoption in the United States has shifted this
practice somewhat, because open adoptions allow varying degrees of ongoing social contact between the adopted child and his or her biological
family (Caterina, 2010). However, open adoptions still sever the legal
parental tie between the biological parents and their child, and moreover,
agreements for ongoing contact with the birth parents may not be enforceable (Appell, 2010; Gaddie, 2009). Adoption requires the consent of both
parents to relinquish the child and terminate parental rights or, alternatively, proof that a parent is unfit in an involuntary termination proceeding. Consent to adoption is generally irrevocable, with a few statutory
exceptions examined further below (Durcan & Appell, 2001).
Typically, due to the permanence of terminating parental rights and a high
esteem for the maternal-child bond, state law extensively regulates the timing,
procedures, and formal requirements for birth mother relinquishment to
ensure that consent is voluntary (Durcan & Appell, 2001). Generally, adoption statutes require a biological parent's written consent to relinquish the

child and that the consent be made before a third party, such as a judge,
notary, or other disinterested witness (Beck, 1998). Rules for the timing and
revocation of consent vary among the states, but generally, consent cannot
be revoked outside of the established time window unless the biological parent proves fraud or duress (Durcan & Appell, 2001).
Almost every state provides that maternal consent for adoption cannot
be given until after the birth of the child, and a number of states prescribe
the number of hours or days that must pass after the child's birth before
the mother can give a valid consent (Durcan & Appell, 2001). A few states
provide additional protections to ensure the validity of the biological parents' consent. For example, Michigan does not allow a biological parent to
grant consent for adoption until an investigation occurs and a judge fully
explains her rights to the parent (Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 710.44 (West
2016)). In Colorado, a parent must receive counseling before consenting to

adoption (Durcan & Appell, 2001).
Few states limit the ability of a minor parent to consent to her child's
adoption (Durcan & Appell, 2001; Seymore, 2013). A small number of states
require either a minor mother's parents to consent to or a judge to approve
the surrender of her parental rights (Durcan & Appell, 2001). Other than a
limited number of exceptions, most states' adoption laws either explicitly provide that the minority status of a parent does not affect her competency to
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consent or make no mention of treating minor parents differently (Durcan
Appell, 2001). In sum, "with near uniformity, adoption law reinforces the
autonomy of a minor's decision to finally and irrevocably relinquish a child,"
ignoring the developmental conditions of youth that courts so emphasize in
the abortion context (Durcan & Appell, 2001, p. 77).

Despite similar sets of interests at stake in a minor's decision to terminate
her pregnancy or to terminate her parental rights through adoption, the law
mandates parental or judicial consent only when a teenager chooses abortion.
However, this apparent contrast on the surface of the law masks the similar
underlying motivations and parallel effects of these legal rules. A closer study
of adoption law reveals two key similarities in both the rules denying autonomy to girls seeking abortion and granting autonomy to girls relinquishing

their infant for adoption. First, both areas of law evince skepticism toward
adolescent girls' reproductive decision-making, whether they seek to terminate a pregnancy or to carry it to term. Second, in practice, both areas of law
operate as a means to punish teenage girls who transgress sexual purity
norms. I aim to emphasize here not the superficial conflicts in the law, but the

deeper similarities in these legal rules that scholars have tended to overlook.
Although in some cases, adoption law likely protects the interests of minor

parents who have good reasons to relinquish their infants for adoption, in
other cases, the grant of "rights" to minor parents to surrender their infants
serves to undermine rather than protect minor parents' parental rights. The
case law on revocation of consent illustrates this point.

All states have promulgated statutory rules for revocation of consent,
but states take a variety of approaches to revocation (Thompson
Hollinger, 2013). Revocation generally depends on timing and whether the
consent was taken in court or extra-judicially (Cal. Fam. Code § 9005(d)

(West, 2016); Durcan & Appell, 2001). Notably, "[A] mother's minority is
not a per se ground for revocation of consent, even before the completion
of the adoption" (Durcan & Appell, 2001). As mentioned above, this
means that the minority of a birth mother is not grounds for revocation of
her consent, even though under the infancy doctrine, she could revoke a
commercial contract. Although courts may take into account the birth
mother's minority in assessing the voluntariness of her consent, the majority of reported decisions reject revocation on the basis of the birth mother's
minority (Kathy O. v. Counseling & Family Servs., 438 N.E.2d 695 (Ill.

App. Ct. 1982); Thompson & Hollinger, 2013). Courts tend to rely on an
analysis focusing on the best interests of the adopted child, and courts tend
to conclude that the mother's minority weighs against revocation because,

based on her age, the court assumes that she cannot adequately care for
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the child (Durcan & Appell, 2001; In re Duarte's Adoption, 229 Cal. App.
2d 775 (Cal. Ct. App. 1964); In re Adoption of Baby C., 480 A.2d 101 (N.H.
1984); Martin v. Ford, 277 S.W.2d 842 (Ark. 1955)). A few cases have permitted revocation but primarily because the court found that revocation

served the best interests of the prospective adoptee rather than based on
the minor birth mother's vulnerability (Durcan & Appell, 2001; Graves v.

Graves, 288 So. 2d 142 (Ala. Civ. App. 1973); In re D., 408 S.W.2d 361
(Mo. Ct. App. 1966); Thompson & Hollinger, 2013. In the abortion context, the Supreme Court specifically relied on notions of minors' presumed
immaturity and vulnerability as justifications for requiring either parental
or judicial approval of the minor's decision to seek abortion care (Bellotti
v. Baird (Belotti I), 443 U.S. 622 (1979)). Yet, courts generally have not
considered what this analysis means for minor parents' voluntary relinquishment of their children for adoption (Appleton, 2011; Seymore, 2013;

In re Adoption of T.B., 232 P.3d 1026 (Utah, 2010)).
So why declare minors to be immature for purposes of abortion consent,
but mature for purposes of adoption consent? First, as in child welfare law,
a skeptical view of an adolescent's decision to become a teenage parent
drives the law, in practice. Scholars suspect that the belief that adolescent
parents should not exercise the right to parent their children explains why
the law treats minor birth parents like adults rather than like children
within the adoption context (Durcan & Appell, 2001). Expanding minors'
rights by permitting them to consent to their infants' adoptions ensures
easier enforcement of supposedly voluntary relinquishments, even in questionable circumstances. Cases in which birth mothers have lost their
attempts to revoke their consent, while only offering a limited window into
voluntary relinquishments, are illuminating here (Samuels, 2005).
One adoption revocation case, decided prior to Roe v. Wade, openly
articulates this rationale - that unmarried minor girls should not possess

parental rights (Martin v. Ford, 277 S.W.2d 842 (Ark. 1955)). In many
cases, however, this pernicious purpose for denying minor parents' parental
rights remains hidden from view. In 1955, an Arkansas court refused to
allow a 16-year-old birth mother, Katherine, to set aside her consent to

adoption of her infant (Martin, 277 S.W.2d 113, 844, 845). Katherine had
granted consent for the adoption two days after giving birth and changed
her mind only four months thereafter, prior to a final adoption decree
(Martin, 277 S.W.2d 113, 844). The facts also suggested that Katherine's
physician pressured her into relinquishing her baby for adoption based on
her age, poverty, and the shame surrounding Katherine's sexual behavior

and the infant's illegitimacy (Martin, 277 S.W.2d 113, 843, 844, 846).
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The court rejected revocation of consent on the ground that allowing the
adoption to stand would serve the best interests of both Katherine and her
infant (Martin, 277 S.W.2d 113, 845). The court emphasized that without

her baby, the teenage mother "could lead a normal life" and would not
have to face her small town "where everyone in the community would
know of her plight" (Martin, 277 S.W.2d 113, 845). As Professors Durcan
and Appell note, the court "substituted its judgment of what was in the
mother's best interest for her own assessment, giving rise to the apparent
anomaly that the same minor is mature enough to decide to relinquish her

baby, but not to decide to keep the child" (Durcan & Appell, 2001, p. 75).
A number of other revocation cases also imply skepticism toward adolescent girls' decisions to parent their infants, and such cases enforce the normative view that minor parents should not possess parental rights.
Second, not only does the apparent expansion of adolescent rights

within the adoption context serve to undermine minor parents' parental
rights in some cases, but revocation case law also reveals that granting
minor parents an unfettered "right" to relinquish provides a means to punish teenage female transgression of sexual mores. Susan Frelich Appleton
conducted an extensive and fascinating study of reproduction and regret in

the law with some particularly poignant insights into the law of relinquishment and revocation. Professor Appleton notes that adoption law and
practice have long treated unmarried mothers as deviant and, hence, unfit
to parent (Appleton, 2011). Several authors have recounted the long history

of narratives of trauma and regret for women pressured or forced to give
up their infants for adoption in the pre-Roe era, particularly white mothers

who could meet the demand for white babies from infertile couples
(Appleton, 2011; Fessler, 2006; Solinger, 2001). This narrative continues to
some extent today, most strikingly, in cases involving young birth mothers'
attempts at revocation.
For example, in a recent case from the Mississippi Supreme Court, In re
Adoption of D.N.T., the court declined to let a 17-year-old birth mother
reclaim her baby, despite a troubling set of facts that the dissent characterized as "coercion" of the birth mother (In re Adoption of D.N.T., 843 So.

2d 690 (Miss. 2003)). The birth mother, Camille, changed her mind about
the adoption only two weeks after signing her consent and after almost two
years of raising her daughter. Camille consented to the adoption while she
was living with the adoptive couple who, evidence showed, had pressured
Camille to sign the adoption papers without having her own lawyer or consulting with her own mother who had helped her raise her daughter. The
evidence showed that Camille believed she would have continued contact
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with her daughter, which the adopting couple denied almost immediately
post-adoption. Camille's mother joined her in the suit to revoke Camille's
consent and nullify the adoption (In re Adoption of D.N.T., 843 So. 2d 690

(Miss. 2003)).
Despite these compelling facts, the Mississippi Supreme Court ruled
against Camille and her mother in a revealing opinion. To justify its decision, the court used several different tactics, including relying on "the state
adoption consent statute that makes the parent's age irrelevant, construing
Camille's initial surrender as an abandonment sufficient to justify termination of parental rights and condemning Camille's bad decisions and immaturity, including ...
her sexual relationship with her new boyfriend"
(Appleton, 2011; In re Adoption of D.N.T., 843 So. 2d, 708). Notably, the
court relied on the lower court's logic that when Camille gave birth, she
became a parent and thus achieved emancipation (In re Adoption of D.N. T.,
843 So. 2d, 709, 710). In response to Camille's contention that because
minors must obtain parental or judicial consent for abortion, the same
should apply for adoption, the court replied:
A minor who is contemplating an abortion has not yet become a parent and there is a
clear distinction in the law between the way a minor child contemplating an abortion is
treated and the way that a minor child contemplating an adoption is considered and it's

the fact of that child's parenthood that makes that decision different. (In re Adoption of
D.N.T., 843 So. 2d, 709)

In other words, when Camille gave birth, she achieved the status of parent,
and thus, the court superficially treated her like an adult in her decisions
about her child, in theory "respecting" her parental rights. Yet, at the same
time the court asserted that Camille should be treated like an adult parent
and held to her decision to relinquish, it also emphasized Camille's "immature" behavior, particularly her sexual behavior, which the court gave as a
reason that she should not continue to parent her daughter (In re Adoption of
D.N.T., 843 So. 2d, 709). The D.N.T. court's rigidly formalistic analysis presents a striking example of how courts can apply both the parent and child
categories at the same time to minor parents, but in a punitive rather than
supportive manner. Because of her formal status as "parent," the court deems
Camille to be mature enough to consent to adoption, but by virtue of her age
and sexual behavior, also deems her too immature to parent her child. Other
courts have engaged in strikingly similar analyses in revocation cases.t
As Professor Appleton explains, although today most unmarried mothers
who choose to give birth also choose to keep their child, "one still sees stories
of deep and anguished regret in reported cases of attempted revocations of
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adoption plans" (Appleton, 2011, p. 281). Yet, birth mothers typically can
only prevail in a revocation case when they can prove coercion or duress, and
many courts have set a high legal threshold to establish such a finding

(Appleton, 2011; In re Baby Boy R., 386 S.E.2d 839 (W. Va. 1989); J.S. v.
S.A., 912 So. 2d 650, 656, 657 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005); Thompson
Hollinger, 2013). For example, one court openly declared, '"proof of inexperience, indecisiveness, uncertainty, emotional stress and a failure to fully com-

prehend the effect of surrender' is insufficient to justify revocation" (In re
Dependency of M.S., 236 P.3d, 218; see also In re Adoption of Baby Girl K.,

615 P.2d 1310, 1315 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980); In re Baby Boy L., 534 N.Y.S.2d
707; Kayla P., 2010 WL 987071; In re Minor ChildDavid, 256 A.2d, 587, 588;
In re Baby Boy L., 534 N.Y.S.2d 706). Thus, "Even when circumstances
raise serious questions about the voluntariness of the initial consent or surrender - as in D.N.T., when the birth mother is a minor and especially

eager prospective adopters have exploited her vulnerabilities - simple
regret, no matter how intensely felt, typically fails to carry the day in
court" (Appleton, 2011, p. 281). Professor Appleton shows that the adoption

case law and literature "suggest that regret has no legal traction because
the initial requirement of voluntary consent itself receives only lip service, as

illustrated by D.N.T' (Appleton, 2011, p. 281).
Strikingly, the revocation cases from private adoption law echo the similarly facile dispatch of voluntary consent requirements in child welfare law.
While child welfare law disproportionately impacts racial minority families

and doubly impacts minority adolescent parents within the system, adoption practices appear to undermine the parental rights of white adolescent
mothers as well (Fessler, 2006). Comparing these two areas of law demon-

strates that, as a whole, the law in practice resists granting minors the right
to parent their children, even though in theory minors possess the same
parental rights as adults.
Comparing adoption law to abortion law also yields interesting insights.

The courts' treatment of regret in adoption law bears a striking contrast to
the use of regret in abortion cases. In Gonzales v. Carhart,the Supreme Court
"makes generalizations about women's post-abortion regret legally relevant"

and deploys the Court's conception of abortion regret as a method for
"reproaching" non-normative women (Appleton, 2011, p. 280). However, in
the adoption context, women's (or girls') post-surrender regret "often carries
no such legal weight" (Appleton, 2011, p. 280). Instead, courts treat the pain
of regret as "well-deserved punishment for women who have transgressed
prevailing sexual norms" (Appleton, 2011, pp. 282, 283). As Professor
Appleton persuasively argues, "[A]doption practice and case law often treat
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regret as a regulatory device, part of the price of illicit sex and also the start
of the road to redemption" (Appleton, 2011, p. 283). The law's deployment
of regret in this manner fits within traditional gender scripts and family law's
preoccupation with sexual discipline (Appleton, 2011).
The upshot is that the "right" of minor parents to relinquish their children for adoption serves the interest, in some cases, of denying the minor
her rights and imposing a kind of punishment for her sexual transgressions,
similarly to judicial bypass in the abortion context (Sanger, 2009). The conflicts in the law on adolescent adoption versus abortion lie at the surface,
while at a deeper level the conflicting rules serve similar latent purposes:
expressing skepticism toward adolescents' reproductive decision-making
and punishing teenage girls' deviations from sexual purity norms.
As currently structured, the law both thwarts minors' access to abortion
on the basis that adolescent girls are too immature to make important
reproductive decisions on their own, and undermines minors' parental
rights on the basis that adolescent girls are not mature enough to parent
their children. A closer study of adolescents' reproductive rights thus
demonstrates that both aspects of the law - the law on abortion rights and
parental rights - work in tandem to enforce traditional gender scripts
about sexuality and motherhood (Cahill, 2013). In particular, the law rein-

forces the notion that a self-sacrificing young mother should give birth and
surrender her child for adoption -

no matter the emotional costs - as a

means to redemption for her sexually irresponsible behavior.
To be clear, this chapter is not arguing for the removal of state oversight
of teenage parents, since protecting the well-being of adolescent parents
and their infants remains a worthy goal. Rather, society needs more effective oversight that supports minors' reproductive decision-making and
seeks to preserve their parental rights if they wish to parent their infants.
This chapter's analysis demonstrates that, despite the formal grant of full
parental rights to minor parents, the law often undermines rather than supports those rights.

A THIRD WAY: THIRD PARTY SUPPORT FOR
PREGNANT OR PARENTING ADOLESCENTS
So what are we to do given the law's suspicion of teenage girls who transgress sexual norms and end up pregnant or parenting? It may be that pregnant or parenting adolescents need no special protection, and that we
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should advocate for greater legal autonomy, both in theory and in practice.
While this approach has some appeal, it is also likely practically and politi-

cally unachievable. Furthermore, there is significant evidence that some
adolescents would benefit from supportive adult guidance when facing difficult, consequential decisions.
Adolescents occupy a unique space between childhood and adulthood
(Mutcherson, 2005; Oberman, 1996). The debates about youth capacity for
sound decision-making continue to rage, and the law reflects these debates.
Youth law scholars have extensively dissected the inconsistencies in the law's
treatment of adolescents (Cunningham, 2006; Rosato, 2011; Scott, 1992).
The growing body of scientific research on child development has only added
fuel to the fire. Science does not provide a simple answer to questions as to
whether or when children might obtain adult-like capacities for sound
decision-making. What the scientific research suggests, putting it all together,

is that adolescents' cognitive functioning is more like that of adults than of
younger children, but adolescents may not exercise "judgment" in the same

manner as adults (Scott, 1992). In other words, adolescents can engage in
rational thought processes but may nevertheless engage in poorer quality
decision-making due to age-related tendencies, such as impulsiveness, a focus
on short-term versus long-term consequences, and undue emphasis on

appearance and peer approval. Thus, although society recognizes that adolescents can engage in adult-like rational thought processes (Mutcherson, 2005)
and adult-like biological behaviors, such as sex and reproduction (James,

2009), society still feels the need to protect adolescents from their own poorer
quality decision-making. Such concerns are especially salient when the wellbeing of another generation - the infants of minor parents - depends upon
the sound judgment of responsible parties. Yet, in the context of sexuality
and reproduction, evidence shows that many teenagers will not or cannot

involve parents in their decision-making, and that forced parental or governmental involvement does not always serve either generation of children's best
interests. Given the tension between the need to make room for adolescents'
growing sense of autonomy and the desire to provide them with adult guidance in important decisions, this part proposes legal reforms that involve
third parties, other than parents or the state, in adolescents' decisions about
pregnancy and parenting.
This part briefly explores possible policy solutions involving third party
adults within the contexts of child welfare, abortion, and adoption law
that would better serve the goals of ensuring sound decision-making for
teenagers and protecting the well-being of minor parents and their infants.
The solutions I propose aim to value increased adolescent autonomy, to

-
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the extent feasible, and to support adolescents' reproductive choices
whether they choose abortion, parenting, or adoption. In this chapter,
"third parties" means adults other than parents or state officials who have
authority over the minor, such as judges or child welfare agents (Appleton,
2008; Manian, 2012). Depending on the context, third parties who might
serve as resources for pregnant or parenting minors include extended family
members, neighbors, and community members; health care professionals;
and lawyers acting on behalf of the minor. Although private family law has
expanded its understanding of the importance of third party adults to
children's well-being, a similar shift has not been taken up as extensively
in child welfare law. Similarly, an alternative to parental involvement
judicial bypass - has long been used in abortion law, but it has been an
ineffective and punitive third party alternative (Manian, 2012). More effec-

tive third party solutions could be deployed both in the abortion context
and in adoption relinquishment cases - for example, requiring third party

counseling in both circumstances. Such solutions would better align the law
in those areas as well.
Policy solutions involving third party adults could accommodate popular intuitions about adolescents' need for adult guidance, while also supporting adolescents' reproductive decision-making whether they seek to
terminate a pregnancy, parent their infants, or relinquish for adoption. It is
important to reiterate that I am not arguing that teenage parents should
have no oversight whatsoever. Expanding the list of kinds of adults who
might become involved with pregnant or parenting youth's decision-

making could provide more effective oversight. We could establish interventions that provide pregnant or parenting teenagers with support from

trusted third party adults in situations where now, those adolescents must
either submit to parental or state authorities who might undermine the
adolescents' reproductive decisions or are given no support until a crisis
occurs. A third party approach could also assist those adolescents who

would benefit from adult counsel while avoiding the potential harms of
enforced parental or state involvement in the sensitive arena of adolescent
sexuality and reproduction.
A number of scholars and researchers have noted that third parties could
help to ensure sound decision-making for adolescents. For example, in the
healthcare context, Jennifer Rosato argues that given individual variation in
development, healthcare providers should be permitted to assess a minor's
maturity and, if appropriate, provide care as the minor wishes without
involving a parent (Rosato, 2011). In a similar vein, Kimberly Mutcherson
argues for a model of shared decision-making between adolescents and
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parents in the healthcare context (Mutcherson, 2005). Her model would
allow exceptions from shared adolescent-parent healthcare decision-making
if an adolescent does not wish to include a parent, such as in decisions about
abortion care (Mutcherson, 2005, 2006). Professor Rosato and Professor
Mutcherson essentially argue for a third party solution with regard to sexual

and reproductive healthcare, with the healthcare provider serving as the third
party adult advisor (Mutcherson, 2005; Rosato, 2011). As Franklin Zimring
argued in his seminal work, adolescence could be treated as a period of

"semi-autonomy," and youths should be given the freedom to make choices
in a protective setting, so that they have a kind of "learners permit" for full
participation in society (Zimring, 1982).
Who that third party should be will vary by the context. A thorough
analysis of various kinds of third party interventions, as well as their pros

and cons, is beyond the scope of this chapter. Below, this part explores a
few possibilities for legal reform involving third party adults who could
more effectively support pregnant or parenting minors. While requiring

involvement of third party adults does not grant adolescents full autonomy,
these proposals aim to value teenagers' own reproductive decisions and
support their choices whether they seek abortion care, to maintain the

(minor) parent-child bond, or to relinquish their infant for adoption. These
recommendations are made tentatively and with the understanding that
third party solutions may be expensive, politically charged, difficult to
implement, and bear risks of their own. Nonetheless, it is important to generate a conversation in this direction. More openness to incorporating third

party adults into adolescent decision-making on reproduction and parenting could potentially benefit many struggling adolescents.

First, with regard to child welfare law, the expansion of third party
rights in private family law suggests models for incorporating third parties

into public family law in ways that would support the minor parent-child
relationship, even if the minor parent cannot care for her infant. In private
family law, as many scholars have noted, parental rights have become disaggregated in numerous ways. The rise of joint custody and corresponding
emphasis on "shared parenting" and growing recognition of functional parents all indicate a move away from an "all or nothing" approach to parenthood (Manian, 2012). In contrast, in public family law, the "all or
nothing" approach still prevails (Gosdoe, 2006). If abuse or neglect has
occurred, advocates for minor parents should focus on obtaining appropri-

ate services for the minor so that she can exit the child welfare system with
her parental rights intact (Stotland & Godsoe, 2006). For those adolescent

parents who cannot maintain custody of their children, the law could look
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to alternatives that allow the minor parent to maintain a relationship with
her infant, even though the infant's primary custody may be transferred to
a third party non-parent adult. Options like subsidized guardianship and
open adoption could allow for an ongoing relationship between the minor
parent and her infant, while also providing appropriate care for the infant
(Stotland & Godsoe, 2006; Gupta-Kagan, 2013). Yet, in child welfare law,
the dyadic parental model still dominates over a triadic model. Placements
incorporating third party adults into the minor parent's relationship with
her infant remain underutilized in favor of the traditional path of termination of parental rights and closed adoption (Godsoe, 2013a).
Third party guardianship or custodial placements that allow for the
minor parent to continue her parental relationship present a better alternative than termination of parental rights, but these options typically come
too late. Even more importantly, we need to emphasize policy solutions to
prevent abuse or neglect by minor parents (Appell, 2011; Garrison, 2005;

Guggenheim, 2005; Gupta-Kagan, 2014; Huntington, 2014). Supportive
adult guidance in the form of a third party adult mentor presents one
promising type of third party early intervention (Godsoe, 2013b). An extensive literature on the benefits of adult mentoring for at-risk youth indicates
that third party adult support can improve outcomes for teenage mothers

and their infants (Klaw et al., 2003; Sipe, 2002; Yancey et al., 2011).
Numerous studies on various forms of mentoring as an intervention for
pregnant and parenting teenagers have indicated positive effects (Black
et al., 2006; Klaw et al., 2003). Researchers have concluded that "it appears
that guidance and support from an adult outside of the home can be
extremely influential in the lives of young mothers" (Klaw & Rhodes, 1995;
Klaw et al., 2003). For example, the nurse-family partnership, which

involves intensive home visits by a nurse during a mother's pregnancy and
for the following two years, has shown that third party adult intervention
can lead to demonstrably positive results (Huntington, 2014). Importantly,
researchers have emphasized, "By relying on nonparent adults, adolescent
mothers can gain some autonomy while simultaneously obtaining much
needed emotional support and advice" (Klaw & Rhodes, 1995). In sum, the
literature on the benefits of nonparent adult mentoring for adolescents reinforces the notion that third party adults can provide effective support for
pregnant and parenting teenagers (Flynn, 1999; Klaw & Rhodes, 1995;

Klaw et al., 2003; Rhodes et al., 1992, 1994).
Obviously, mentoring programs and other solutions incorporating third
party adults into the minor parent-child relationship, such as subsidized

guardianship and open adoption, do not provide a panacea for the many ills
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of the child welfare system. The child welfare system is extremely compli-

cated, and no single simple solution can address its myriad problems. The
well-being of pregnant and parenting adolescents also strongly depends on

other resources, such as adequate healthcare, child care, housing, and educational and employment opportunities (Klaw & Rhodes, 1995). Thinking
about solutions that look to third party adults to assist minor parents in their
parenting, rather than heavy-handed state intervention, represents just one
move in the right direction to provide substance to minors' parental rights.

Third party adult support could help to ensure that minor parents in the system can maintain a parental relationship with their children if they wish, and
most importantly, this support can help to keep minor parents and their

infants out of the child welfare system in the first place.
Second, with regard to the abortion and adoption contexts, providing
pregnant or parenting teenagers with the option to seek guidance from

third party adults offers much promise for more effective protection of
adolescents' well-being. I have argued elsewhere that developments in private family law bolster the case for amending statutes requiring parental
involvement with abortion to allow teenagers to consult with designated
adults other than parents or judges (Manian, 2012). In particular, private
family law's increasing recognition of the importance of non-parent third

party adults in children's lives buttresses calls for reformulating parental
involvement legislation to permit adolescent girls to obtain consent from

trusted adults other than parents and in lieu of a formal judicial interrogation. As in the abortion context, we should consider whether adult
support - and what kinds of adult support - would better serve the
well-being of minor parents considering relinquishment of their infant for

adoption. Regulatory reform of both abortion and adoption law to include
involvement by third party non-parent, non-state adults, would also make

for a more obviously coherent body of law on pregnant teenagers who
choose to avoid parenting either through abortion or adoption (Seymore,
2013). Reforms looking to third parties could also more effectively serve
the law's purported goal of ensuring sound decision-making for pregnant
teenagers choosing abortion or adoption, rather than surreptitiously operating
as a means of punishment (Samuels, 2005).

For example, perhaps offering adolescents who are considering either
abortion or adoption relinquishment a menu of options to choose from in
terms of seeking adult guidance in their decision-making would grant adolescents some autonomy while still ensuring adult oversight. In the abortion
context, states could allow teenage girls to choose between involving a
parent, an adult family member, a counselor, or a judge prior to receiving
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abortion care. Scholars have proposed such reforms to parental involvement
legislation, and a few states have adopted laws that allow for third parties
other than judges to approve adolescent girls' abortion care (Manian, 2012).
Similarly, adoption law could provide a list of adults that a minor parent
choosing relinquishment would consult prior to a final consent to relinquishment. Birth parent advocates, scholars, and courts have argued for
various kinds of adoption law reforms, particularly for minor parents consenting to voluntary relinquishment. Adoption case law and literature suggest that mandatory parental or judicial involvement in minor parents'
relinquishment decisions could present many of the same problems of
shaming and imposition of the adults' own normative judgments as in the
abortion context (Adoption of J.M.M. v. New Beginnings of Tupelo, Inc.,

796 So. 2d 975, 983 (Miss. 2001); Gaughan v. Gilliam, 401 N.W.2d 687
(Neb. 1987); Hollinger, 2013; Wier, 2003). While mandatory parental or
judicial approval may prove arbitrary, the absence of any adult guidance in
some cases leaves the minor parent vulnerable to coercive influence from
others, as the revocation case law demonstrates.
Instead of enforced parental or judicial involvement prior to relinquishment, the law could also give minors the option of seeking professional counseling or independent legal representation, along with
procedural reforms, such as longer time frames post-birth for obtaining
consent for relinquishment (Appleton, 2011; Samuels, 2005). As in abortion law, counseling by health care professionals could serve as a more

effective means of supporting sound decision-making than a judicial
interrogation. 2 In addition, adoption law critics often suggest that independent legal representation for birth parents is a crucially needed
reform, especially for minor parents (Glesner Fines, 2011; Sankaran,
2009, 2010). Many states permit out-of-court consents to be executed
before a notary public or even the attorney representing the prospective
adoptive parents - procedures that are "often criticized as providing
insufficient evidence that the parent executing the consent or relinquishment did so knowingly and voluntarily" (Hollinger, 2013; Unif. Adoption
Act § 2-405(a)(4) (1994)). Thus, adoption law experts have long advocated for independent legal representation for minor parents considering
executing a voluntary consent for adoption (Unif. Adoption Act § 2-405(c);
Samuels, 2005). Particularly given the complexity of open adoption, the
current form of many if not most domestic adoptions (Appell, 2010;
Appleton, 2011; Gaddie, 2009), minor parents would likely benefit from
having their own lawyer who could accurately describe their rights postadoption (Seymore, 2013).
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Of course, adequate counseling and legal advice do not provide a silver
bullet for the variety of concerns surrounding minor parents' relinquishments, particularly given the ethical complexities involved when lawyers
represent minors (Sanger & Willemsen, 1992). There is an extensive literature debating the lawyers' role in representing adolescents and children

(Elrod, 2007; Glesner Fines, 2011; Hollinger, 2013; Sankaran, 2010). In
many cases, it remains uncertain whether the lawyer should represent the
minors' expressed wishes or determine the best interests for the minor. In
the case of minor parents, the best interests of both generations of children
must be considered, complicating matters further.
This question - what role should the third party adult play in the minor's decision-making - is a pitfall for any type of third party intervention.
If the law gives the third party adult decision-making power rather than
limiting him or her to a counseling role, then minors could still be subjected
to restrictions on their rights and shamed for their sexual behavior. The

aunt, counselor, or lawyer could arbitrarily obstruct access to abortion care
or pressure a minor to relinquish her infant for adoption as much as a
parent or judge. Furthermore, if reformed laws provided adolescents with a

menu of options for adult guidance, it would be necessary to ensure that
the state provided the resources to cover the costs of independent counselors and attorneys. In child welfare law, a lack of sufficient resources to
support teenage and adult parents remains an endemic problem within the

system. The resources question makes it especially difficult to support
options like mentoring programs in the child welfare context.
Finally, critics of proposals to involve third party adults in adolescent
reproductive decisions may challenge some types of legal reform as unduly
interfering with parents' constitutional right to control their children's
upbringing. Particularly in the politically charged context of abortion, for
some parents expanding parental involvement legislation to include parental surrogates may feel like more of a diminishment of parental rights than
allowing a judicial bypass. Some states have gone so far as to enact legisla-

tion authorizing civil law suits against persons who assist minors in obtaining an abortion without parental consent or judicial bypass as required by
state law (Planned Parenthood of Kansas v. Nixon, 220 S.W.3d

732

(Mo. 2007); Wyatt v. McDermott, 725 S.E.2d 555 (Va. 2012)). In vehemently anti-abortion states, law reform to expand minors' access to abortion care through third party support could be an upstream battle and
require significant changes to multiple statutes.
Despite the challenges, risks and costs of implementing policy reforms
incorporating third party adults into laws governing pregnant and
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parenting minors, it is worth exploring these solutions in more detail. The
law already recognizes that in decisions related to sexuality and reproduction, parents may not be able to fulfill their commonly understood role of
acting in their children's best interests (Oberman, 1996; Scott, 2000). Third
party parental surrogates can serve as an alternative that accounts for the
in-between state of adolescence in particularly sensitive contexts. In addition, third party parental surrogates could better effectuate the stated goals
of ensuring sound decision-making and protecting children's well-being in
situations where parental or state intervention may not serve those goals.

CONCLUSION
Advancements in minors' rights to autonomy in their reproductive decisions remain illusory. In its operation, the law takes a highly skeptical view
of adolescents' reproductive decision-making, whether they choose abortion or childbirth. As enforced by state officials, the law on adolescent
reproduction serves as a means to punish teenage girls' sexuality and
impose traditional gender norms, rather than as a means to the purported
goals of ensuring sound adolescent decision-making and protecting children's well-being.
The public and policy makers remain gripped by the intuition that many

adolescents would benefit from adult guidance in making consequential
decisions. The law reflects this intuition in practices that force parental or
state oversight when minors choose abortion or parenthood. Although
some adolescents can make decisions about abortion, parenting, and relinquishing their child for adoption without being required to consult an
adult, legal reforms that incorporate third party adult involvement in these
decisions could satisfy the perceived need for pregnant or parenting teens
to receive adult support and would provide options other than parental or
state authority. Policy reforms that look to third party adults could help
the law to explicitly acknowledge and make room for the unique needs of
adolescents by addressing the absence of supportive parents and providing
alternatives to overly restrictive state interventions that undermine minors'
reproductive decision-making. Incorporating third party adults into laws
governing pregnant or parenting adolescents offers much potential. By considering options that reside between the extremes of complete autonomy or
complete subjection to the authority of parent and state, we could create

much needed space for adolescence in the law.
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NOTES
. For additional cases, see, for example, Fowler v. Merkle, 564 So. 2d 960,
96-162 (Ala. Civ. App. 1989) (denying revocation of consent); Kayla P. v. Morgan
C., No. 1 CA-JV 09-0190, 2010 WL 987071 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010); Kathy O. v.
Counseling & Family Servs., 438 N.E.2d 695 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (15-year-old parent's consent to adoption was not revocable based on minority); In re Minor Child
David, 256 A.2d 583, 587, 588 (Me. 1969); Grafe v. Olds, 556 So. 2d 690 (Miss.
1990) (denying revocation of consent during period of placement of child with prospective parents and entry of adoption decree); In re Adoption of A.D.A., 789 S.
W.2d 842 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (denying revocation of consent); In re Baby Boy L.,
534 N.Y.S.2d 706 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988); In re Adoption of J.H., No. 06CA008902,
2006 WL 3257525, at *1, *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2006) (denying withdrawal of
consent by 17-year-old); In re Adoption of Morrison, 560 P.2d 240 (Okla. Civ. App.
1976) (holding that consent executed by 16-year-old mother is effective even though
she did not have counsel or guardian ad litem and opining that requirement of court
approval adequately protected minor parents); Sigurdson v. Wash. Dep't of Soc.
Health Serv. (In re Dependency of M.S.), 236 P.3d 214, 218 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010)
(quoting In re Adoption of Baby Girl K, 615 P.2d 1310, 1316 (Wash. Ct. App.
1980)). But see Ex parte Sullivan, 407 So. 2d 559 (Ala. 1981) (returning child to
17-year-old birth mother even after passage of significant period of time due to failure to follow statutory requirements of adoption consent); A.F. v. Spence-Chapin
Agency, 537 N.Y.S.2d 752 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1989) (questioning whether minor
father's consent to adoption was voluntary but nevertheless concluding that father's
consent was not required); Janet G. v. Foundling Hosp. 403 N.Y.S.2d 646 (N.Y.
Fam. Ct. 1978) (permitting minor mother's revocation of consent based on evidence
that mother had not voluntarily, informingly, and knowingly surrendered her child
for adoption, and noting the special vulnerability minors experience when making
important decisions); see also Gary D. Spivey, Annotation, What Constitutes
"Duress" in Obtaining Parent'sConsent to Adoption of Child or Surrender of Child to
Adoption Agency, 74 A.L.R.3d 527 (1976); Jack W. Shaw, Annotation, What
Constitutes Undue Influence in Obtaining A Parent's Consent to Adoption of Child,
50 A.L.R.3d 918 (1973).
2. Of course, requiring independent counseling and the waiting periods that typically go along with such counseling in the adoption context would echo standard
techniques of anti-abortion advocacy. Borgmann, C. (2010). Abortion: The undue
burden standard, and the evisceration of women's privacy. William & Mary Journal
of Women and the Law, 16(2), 291 (discusses the "undue burden" of abortion regulations, including waiting periods, "informed consent" and independent counseling,
as "physical, familial, and spiritual invasions of women's privacy"). If such requirements make sense in adoption law, then those opposed to abortion might argue,
why not also in abortion law? In other words, can advocates for minors' reproductive rights coherently argue in favor of counseling and waiting periods in adoption
law while resisting such requirements in abortion law? One argument is that more
involvement by third party adults might be needed in the adoption context than in
the abortion context. In abortion care, the physician is already obligated to ensure
the patient's informed consent and can serve as third party support for the minor.
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Adoption is also legally more complicated, particularly given the confusion sur-

rounding open adoption and the number of revocation cases where false promises
of ongoing visitation have induced birth mothers to relinquish their children and
led to revocation disputes. See, e.g., In re S.O., 795 P.2d 254, 254 (Colo. 1990)
(holding that biological mother and stepfather's unenforceable and false promise of
visitation rights did not constitute fraud sufficient to invalidate the consent); In re
Adoption of J.H.G., 869 P.2d 640, 648-49 (Kan. 1994) (holding that birth mother
failed to establish that adoptive parents had fraudulently promised that she would
have post-adoption visitation); In re Adoption of D.N.T., 843 So. 2d 690, 711-12
(Miss. 2003) (denying minors' request for revocation of consent despite facts showing minor parent was denied promise of visitation); Kathleen G. v. Saint Laurence

Cty. Dept of Soc. Servs., 565 N.Y.S.2d 875, 877 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (holding
that birth mother would be held to her voluntary surrender of child even though
she had mistaken belief she would be entitled to visitation). Nevertheless, given
political resistance to abortion rights, it might be most feasible to seek statutory
reforms requiring that independent counseling professionals guide teenage decision
making in both the abortion and adoption contexts.
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